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Podlas: Reconsidering the Nomos

RECONSIDERING THE NOMOS IN TODAY’S MEDIA
ENVIRONMENT
Kimberlianne Podlas*
ABSTRACT
Today’s media landscape is wholly unlike that which existed
when Cover first discussed narrative and the nomos; specifically, the
status of television as both a cultural messenger and object of scholarly
study has changed significantly. Accordingly, this article contemplates narrative in the contemporary media environment, specifically,
television as an essential source of narratives. To enhance understandings of the roles television narratives play and which narratives play a
role, this article employs an empirical perspective. Surveying Media
Theory, it outlines research on television effects, including when and
why television’s representations of law can impact audience attitudes,
behaviors, perceptions, knowledge, and judgements. It then summarizes and explores recent changes in the media environment – digital
platforms and streaming content, unprecedented audience selectivity
and fragmentation, cable news differentiation, and Twitter – and considers what impacts these have on audiences and the nomos.

*
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INTRODUCTION

Forty years ago, when Cover wrote of what he called “the nomos,” he labeled himself an outlier. While this symposium robustly
demonstrates why that is no longer the case, the intellectually-dense
writing, references to biblical and ancient texts, and new terminology
that Cover used to present his ideas may have contributed to that notion. Notwithstanding, reduced to its core, Cover advocated that our
common cultural lexicon of narrative was key to conveying, mediating, and reconstructing legal and cultural meaning.
Today’s media landscape is wholly unlike that which existed
when Cover first discussed narrative and the nomos; and the status of
television as both a cultural messenger and object of scholarly study
has changed significantly. Accordingly, this article contemplates narrative in the contemporary media environment by primarily focusing
on television as an essential source of narratives. To enhance our understanding of the roles these narratives play, this article employs an
empirical perspective; it outlines research on television effects, including when and why television’s representations of law and the legal system can affect audiences, and what some of those impacts may be.
II.

NARRATIVE, MEDIATION, AND MEANING

Cover said “[w]e inhabit a nomos—a normative universe”1
comprised of not only formal law, i.e., “[t]he rules and principles of
justice, the formal [culture and] institutions of the law,”2 but also the
common or popular culture of law, i.e., what laypeople understand
those laws to “mean” as well as whether the law and the legal system
has meaning.3
The connective tissue, and key to meaning-making, is narrative.4 Our culture’s narratives of law show and tell, explain and translate, reply and rewrite. Through their plots, heroes, victims, and
1

Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4 (1983).
Id. (These “are, indeed, important . . . but a small part of the normative universe . .
. .”).
3
Kimberlianne Podlas, Impact of Television on Cross-Examination and Juror
“Truth,” 14 WIDENER L. REV. 479, 489-90 (2009).
4
Cover, supra note 1, at 4-5, 18 (narrative is indispensable in the quest for meaning);
Podlas, supra note 3, at 481; see also Gal Hertz, Narratives of Justice: Cover’s Moral
Creativity, 14 L. & HUMANS. 3, 4-5 (2020).
2
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lessons, narratives provide context and make sense (or nonsense) of
the law.5 For better or worse, they show how the legal system impacts
people’s lives and achieves its notion of justice, or fail to live up to its
promises. By helping people see the value and understand why the
legal system deserves respect,6 our stories contribute to the law’s normative force it to function.7 Indeed, “[n]o set of legal institutions or
prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that locate it and give it
meaning.”8
This narrative mediation of law is not unidirectional, but multidimensional. Narratives emerging from, refracted by, and transformed
through popular culture also tell institutions of law what people believe.9 Stories reveal how people think the law really works (and for
whom), how its trustees are perceived to behave,10 what its priorities
and blind spots are, and expectations for what it can achieve.11 As
Cover observed, narrative bridges the “‘is,’ [] the ‘ought,’. . . and the

5

Cover, supra note 1, at 4-5; Kimberlianne Podlas, Respect My Authority! South
Park’s Expression of Legal Ideology and Contribution to Legal Culture, 11 VAND.
J. ENT. & TECH. L. 491, 495-96 (2009) (describing law and popular culture, and
drawing on Cover’s thesis); see also Michail Vafeiadis et al., Narratives in Political
Advertising: An Analysis of the Political Advertisements in the 2014 Midterm Elections, 62 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 354, 355 (2018) (“Narratives are essentially stories that people tell.”).
6
Cover, supra note 1, at 4-5.
7
Cover, supra note 1, at 4-7, 10; Kimberlianne Podlas, Funny or No Laughing Matter?: How Television Viewers Interpret Satires of Legal Themes, 21 SETON HALL J.
SPORTS & ENT. L. 289, 293 (2011); see Julen Etxabe, The Legal Universe After Robert Cover, 4 L. & HUMANS. 115, 120 (2010) (“Cover’s legal universe contains not
only a body of precepts but, fundamentally, a set of narratives and myths that validate
the former and give them meaning.”).
8
Cover, supra note 1, at 4, 11; see also Etxabe, supra note 7, at 120 (“To know the
law is therefore to learn its language . . . . To be a competent speaker of this language
requires more than knowing how a particular concept or precept is used and connects
with others; significantly, one must know how it is charged, that is, the heavy load
of symbols, connotations and values it carries with it.”).
9
Michael Asimow, Preface: Popular Culture Matters, in LAWYERS IN YOUR LIVING
ROOM! LAW ON TELEVISION xx (2009); Etxabe, supra note 7, at 120 (“Cover’s legal
universe contains . . . a set of narratives and myths that . . . give [law] meaning.”).
10
Lief H. Carter & Michael McCann, Measuring Humanity: Rights in the 24th Century, in LAW AND JUSTICE ON THE SMALL SCREEN 17-18 (2012); Kimberlianne Podlas, Blame Judge Judy: The Effects of Syndicated Television Courtroom on Jurors,
25 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOCACY 557 (2002); Podlas, supra note 5, at 493, 495-97.
11
Cover, supra note 1, at 36-37; see Hertz, supra note 4, at 23 (“According to Cover,
law is always constituted in relation to a present state of aﬀairs . . . .”).
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‘what might be.’”12 Thus, the narratives emerging from “common culture” are simultaneously a forum to debate issues, a Nielsen poll of
what people think works or needs to change, and a script – written in a
universal language – for transforming it.13
Accordingly, while law and narratives of it are separate, they
also concurrently impact one another.14 Although Cover described this
with a new lexicon and examples from “high culture” juridical and ancient texts, fundamentally he articulated a central tenet of the study of
popular culture:15 stories in popular culture both reflect and contribute
to what people believe, operating symbiotically with and within the
cultural environment.16
III.

NARRATIVES OF LAW IN POPULAR CULTURE

Presumably, most participants in this symposium believe in the
concept of the nomos and in Cover’s thesis that stories are the key to
meaning-making or a decryption key to the nomos. Acknowledging
that the narratives matter is only a starting point. In advancing Cover’s
work and applying it within the present media environment, we need
to consider on which narratives to focus and what their contribution is.
What evidence exists that the stories we reference are salient and impact, or are understood by, the audience in the way we believe?17

12

Cover, supra note 1, at 10; Hertz, supra note 4, at 22-23 (explaining that, to Cover,
narratives were a subversive means for reimagining the normative world).
13
Cover, supra note 1, at 10 (“Narratives are models through which we study and
experience transformations. . . .”); see Hertz, supra note 4, at 6 (arguing that Cover
believed narrative is “where legality, and more broadly, normativity itself is created,
suspended, broadened and debated.”).
14
Cover, supra note 1, at 5 (explaining that law and narrative are interdependent).
15
Kimberlianne Podlas, The Tales Television Tells: Understanding the Nomos
Through Television, 13 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV 31, 37-38 (2006).
16
Asimow, supra note 9, at xx-xxi; Podlas, supra note 15, at 32; Podlas, supra note
5, at 493, 495-97; Peter Robson & Jessica Silbey, Introduction, in LAW AND JUSTICE
ON THE SMALL SCREEN 1-2 (2012).
17
Cassandra Sharp, Let’s See How Far We’ve Come: The Role of Empirical Methodology in Exploring Television Audiences, in LAW AND JUSTICE ON THE SMALL
SCREEN, 112-15 (2012) (stating there is a “void” in research about connection between television representations of law and audience meaning-making, and arguing
that legal research must consider this using a “more sophisticated approach.”).
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Cover wrote of the nomos in 1982, coinciding with the emergence of the Law and Literature movement.18 Not surprisingly, he and
others engaged in law-to-law discourse spoke of narratives in legal
opinions, canonical writings, ancient texts, and literature.19 Nonetheless, we – people trained in law – operate in the gravitational force of
law, so are predisposed to seeing the world through that lens. This can
cause us to pay disproportionate attention to “high culture” narratives20
most laypeople do not read or contribute to and assign meanings to
these sources that are neither supported by lay opinion nor empirical
research does not support). Therefore, restricting our focus to texts
that legal experts and scholars find emblematic risks misconstruing the
nomos.21 Indeed, Cover cautioned that he was not implying that there
was some “official, privileged canon of narrative.”22 Consequently, it
is critical to survey stories of law circulating in and refracted by popular culture, specifically the ones most commonly consumed by the public.
In addition to looking at salient narrative artifacts, we need to
determine if we are interpreting them accurately. Whether considering
stories of law or media content, a narrative can have multiple “readings.”23 What law professors and lawyers think narratives mean can
be quite different from how audiences perceive or creators intend

18

Robson & Silbey, supra note 16, at 2 (noting that scholarship on law and film and
law and literature began in earnest in the mid-1980s, and soon flourished).
19
Hertz, supra note 4, at 5-6 (noting research examining narratival dimensions of
law and law vis-a-vis literature), and at 6 (introduction of storytelling into the study
of jurisprudence).
20
Examples of high culture narratives include appellate opinions, law journal articles, and treatises.
21
To put it bluntly, we may not be the best people to select the narratives, let alone
determine what they mean to or were meant by the masses. See Etxabe, supra note
7, at 115 (“The idea that law consists of a set of rules emanating from a sovereign
authority is so ingrained in our ways of thinking about the law—from professionals
to ordinary citizens, from legal academics to those who touch upon law in other
fields—that trying to shift that habit of perception may appear … daunting[.]”).
22
Cover, supra note 1, at 4 n.3.
23
Podlas, supra note 7, at 291-92; see also Paul W. Kahn, Community in Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 99 YALE L.J. 1, 54, 58-59 (1989) (recognizing that narratives are sometimes understood differently than intended, or are perceived differently by different audiences and analyzing the separation of authority and
interpretation).
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them24 Therefore, it is valuable to determine whether and how narratives impact people in reality, rather than merely opining that they do.25
IV.

TELEVISION: A COMPENDIUM OF NARRATIVES

Although we find narratives in various mediums, television is
American culture’s greatest compendiums of stories.26 Sometimes television supplements information gleaned from personal experience
(e.g., peer-group, family, work, school); other times, it substitutes for
direct experience by providing windows into worlds and introductions
to people with whom viewers otherwise have no contact.27 Television
also acts symbiotically with other aspects of pop culture contributing
to and reflecting what people believe.28
Research shows that television’s impact on audiences is typically greater than that of other mass media.29 This is largely due to its
scope.30 Television delivers a massive amount of content to the public,
every hour of every day,31 and has become America’s primary source

24

This is not an instance where the better scholarly argument prevails.
Sharp, supra note 17, at 111-12.
26
Laurena Bernabo, Expanding Television’s Cultural Forums in the Digital Era:
Prime Time Television, Twitter, and Black Lives Matter, 63 J. BROAD. & ELEC.
MEDIA 77 (2019); see also Podlas, supra note 5, at 491, 493, 499; Julius Riles et al.,
Representations of Interpersonal Interaction and Race / Ethnicity, 62 J. BROAD. &
ELEC. MEDIA 302 (2018).
27
Kimberlianne Podlas, Guilty on All Accounts: Law & Order’s Impact on Public
Perceptions of Law and Order, 18 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 1, 11-14 (2008);
Riles et al., supra note 25, at 302.
28
Asimow, supra note 9, at xx-xxi; Xioa Wang, Entertainment, Education, or Propaganda, 54 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 391, 391 (2010) (describing TV as the primary
cultural storyteller).
29
Podlas, supra note 5, at 496-98; Riles et al., supra note 26, at 303; Vafeiadis et al.,
supra note 5, at 357, 364; Wang, supra note 28, at 391.
30
Mark D. Harmon et al., Affluenza Revisited: Casting Doubt on Cultivation Effects,
63 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 268, 270-71 (2019).
31
Riles et al., supra note 26, at 303-04 (repeating stories, information, depictions,
and content); Wang, supra note 28, at 391 (repeating content); see also Carter &
McCann, supra note 10, at 17-18 (stating how TV stories saturate pop culture). This
was also furthered by deregulation, which led to more cable networks. Bethany Anne
Conway & Robin Stryker, Does a Speaker’s (In)formal Role in News Media Shape
Perceptions of Political Incivility? 65 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 24 (2021).
25
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of shared entertainment and information.32 According to Nielsen Media Research, the average viewer watched more than twenty-eight
hours of live or time-shifted network television content per week last
year.33 In fact, once streaming and app or web-viewing is included,
television consumption has increased over the past three years.34
Not only is television content highly available, but also the medium’s characteristics make it intellectually accessible. Generally, television content is presented in standard narrative format, organized to
flow from a beginning to an end or from an issue to conclusion.35 Furthermore, programs use established conventions, such as “Previously
on . . .” recaps, establishing shots, split-screens, timed “act breaks,”
and on-screen graphics, to help communicate meaning. Together,
these tools make content easier to follow by facilitating cognitive processing and comprehension.36
Television also utilizes visual, aural, and textual mechanisms
to underscore important information and orient viewers,37 such as camera-work, lighting/color pallets, graphics, editing conventions (e.g., reaction shots, montages, dissolves, cross-cuts), B-roll, music cues and
scores.38 These enable television to convey more information to

32

Robson & Silbey, supra note 10, at 2-3 (asserting that, while literature and film
are important, the average person is exposed to far more TV than other forms of
information).
32
The Nielsen Total Audience Report: August 2020, NIELSEN (Sept. 18, 2021, 11:03
AM)
https://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/report/2020/the-nielsen-total-audience-report-august-2020; see also Felix Richter, The Generation Gap in TV Consumption, STATISTA (Nov. 20, 2020), https://www.statista.com/chart/15224/dailytv-consumption-by-us-adults.
34
The Nielsen Total Audience Report: August 2020 (Aug. 13, 2020),
https://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/report/2020/the-nielsen-total-audience-report-august-2020 (25% of television consumption was via a streaming service).
35
Hyang-Sook Kim & Kyongseok Kim, Open Captioning as a Means of Communicating Health Information: The Role of Cognitive Load in Processing EntertainmentEducation Content, 64 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 519, 519-21 (2020) (defining “narrative” as a cohesive, coherent story with a beginning, middle, and end that provides
information or that raises issues and provides a resolution); Vafeiadis et al., supra
note 5, at 357; see Podlas, supra note 3, at 481 (“narrative is a natural way of thinking”).
36
Kim & Kim, supra note 35, at 519-21; Vafeiadis et al., supra note 5, at 355-57.
For an overview of the cognitive processing of information in narrative form, see
Kim & Kim, supra note 35, at 521-23.
37
Kim & Kim, supra note 35, at 532.
38
Bernabo, supra note 26, at 79; Wang, supra note 28, at 391.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2022

7

Touro Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 4 [2022], Art. 18

2218

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 37

viewers on multiple, simultaneous “frequencies” without over-taxing
cognitive resources.39 This can improve viewer engagements compared with the same information in unimodal form or communicated
through another medium, which makes television easier to process40
and remember.41 Moreover, television is an equal opportunity medium, as large swaths of identical content are delivered to everyone
free, and its impacts are not limited to “high culture” eighteen-hour
PBS documentaries and Pulitzer-winning news reporting. In fact, research has found that entertainment programming such as police procedurals and doctor/hospital shows, often impact viewers more than
news programming.42
V.

NARRATIVES AND MEDIA THEORY

Several disciplines that study narrative, including film theory,
cultural studies, and literary theory, favor humanistic and interpretive
approaches. Using a disciplinary lens or means of analysis, they explore what an exemplar (or representations in it) reflects or says about
society, politics, law, history, etc.; how it does so; what tools it uses;
and its broader cultural meanings.43 This article does not subscribe to
such a humanistic approach to analyzing television narrative.44 Instead, this article considers narratives in and of pop culture through the
lens of media theory.
A core concern of media theory is whether and how mass media content, such as television programs, news and political discourse,
social media posts, impacts people (if at all). In particular, media effects research posits a relationship between exposure to media content
39

Kim & Kim, supra note 35, at 532 (discussing the ease in processing visual TV
narrative).
40
Kim & Kim, supra note 35, at 532.
41
Jennifer Hoewe & Lindsey A. Sherrill, The Influence of Female Lead Characters
on Political TV Shows, 63 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 59, 61-64 (2019).
42
Id. at 60-65; Michael Stefanone et al., The Relationship Between Traditional Mass
Media and “Social Media”: Reality Television as a Model for Social Network Site
Behavior, 54 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 508, 510 (2010).
43
CARTER & MCCANN, supra note 10, at 4-6; Sharp, supra note 17, at 111-15. Although scholars may propose alternative readings, they typically presume that whatever narrative artifact the scholar chose to examine is relevant and that the analysis
is sound.
44
Furthermore, there is no need to, as these approaches are already well-represented
by scores of brilliant scholars.
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and viewer response or reactions.45 The types of effects vary depending on a number of intervening and mediating factors.46 Hence, scholars analyze “media texts,” such as news and television shows, but the
character and nature of this inquiry (be it quantitative or qualitative) is,
to some degree, empirical.47 It is grounded in testing a theory or obtaining something resembling evidence. Accordingly, inasmuch Media Theory focuses on the message as understood by and impacting the
audience, it is a valuable tool for considering narrative, and can enhance interpretive approaches.
VI.

AN INTRODUCTION TO TELEVISION EFFECTS

From a media theory perspective, it is important to understand
which stories (or messages and depictions within those stories) under
what circumstances have effects, what those are, why they may occur,
and how they translate to the “real world.” After all, not every narrative has an effect, let alone the one a scholar imagines; indeed, effects
are limited by the way viewers interpret the dominant message.48
Many people accept that television has effects, but some of the
conventionally-accepted wisdom about them is misunderstood or not
substantiated by empirical evidence. Typically, television does not impact viewers in a direct or immediate way,49 and there is little evidence
45

Jae Kook Lee, Knowledge as a Measure of News Receptions in the Agenda-setting
Process, 59 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 22, 32 (2015); Stephan Winter et al., Shared
Entertainment Shared Opinions, 62 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 21, 25 (2018).
46
These include the amount of content consumed; clarity, consistency, and repetition
of messages; message features; audience characteristics; and the receiver’s pre-existing beliefs. See infra notes 59-139 and accompanying text.
47
Kimberlianne Podlas, Testing Television: Studying and Understanding the Impact
of Television’s Depictions of Law and Justice, in LAW AND JUSTICE ON THE SMALL
SCREEN 87-96, 106 (Peter Robson & Jessica Silbey eds., 2012).
48
Kimberlianne Podlas, The “CSI Effect” and Other Forensic Fictions, 27 LOY. L.A.
ENT. L. REV. 87, 87 (2006-07); George Gerbner, Growing Up With Television: The
Cultivation Perspective, in MEDIA EFFECTS: ADVANCES IN THEORY AND RESEARCH
17, 23-25 (Jennings Bryant & Dolf Zillman eds., 1994).
49
Steven Eggermont, Television Viewing, Perceived Similarity, and Adolescents’
Expectations of a Romantic Partner, 47 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 244, 248 (2004);
Podlas, supra note 7, at 296; Podlas, supra note 5, at 499. For example, violence on
television does not directly cause violence, but may desensitize viewers to violence.
Even then, it depends on type of violence expressed in the narrative: is it trivialized,
unpleasant, presented with a moral justification, consequences for victims. T. Franklin Waddell et al., When Media Violence Awakens our Better Nature: The Effect of
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that people learn concrete rules from TV content.50 Instead, television
affects people in more subtle, long-term or indirect ways.51
Television is a cultural forum.52 Its repetition of stories within
and across programs conveys norms, ideologies,53 and values and cultivate beliefs about society.54 The issues featured signal what is important or deserves attention,55 the accompanying frames guide how
viewers conceptualize those issues,56 and the cumulative repetition of
the narratives and events shown shape perceptions of reality (including
how common something is57 or how to behave).58

Unpleasant Violence on Reactivity Toward Enjoyment of Media Violence, 63 J.
BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 698, 698-701 (2019).
50
Podlas, supra note 3, at 500. Content may, however, increase recognition recall,
issue awareness, or prime audiences. Lei Guo & Chris J. Vargo, Predictors of International News Flow: Exploring a Networked Global Media System, 64 J. BROAD. &
ELEC. MEDIA 418, 420 (2020).
51
Podlas, supra note 7, at 296-99; see Michael Morgan & James Shanahan, The State
of Cultivation, 54 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 337 (2010).
52
Bernabo, supra note 26, at 77-80, 85; Wang, Entertainment, supra note 28, at 391.
This is particularly true of entertainment television.). Bernabo, supra note 26, at 7780.
53
Dana Mastro & Andrea Figueroa-Caballero, Measuring Extremes: A Quantitative
Content Analysis of Prime Time TV Depictions of Body Type, 62 J. BROAD. & ELEC.
MEDIA 320, 322 (2018); L.J. Shrum, Effects of Television Portrayals of Crime and
Violence on Viewers’ Perceptions of Reality: A Psychological Process Perspective,
22 L. STUD. F. 257, 260-62 (1998).
54
Riles et al., supra note 26, at 303; Stefanone et al., supra note 42, at 510; Wang,
supra note 28, at 391.
55
Daniel Bergan & Heysung Lee, Media Credibility and the Base Rate Fallacy, 63
J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 195, 197-98 (2019); Lee, supra note 44, at 22-24; Mastro
& Figueroa-Caballero, supra note 53, at 322-23;
Podlas, supra note 5, at 499-500.
56
Erin Klawitter & Eszter Hargittai, Shortcuts to Well Being? Evaluating the Credibility of Online Health Information Through Multiple Complementary Heuristics, 62
J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 251, 253 (2018); Mastro & Figueroa-Caballero, supra
note 53, at 316; Scott Parrott et al., Portrayals of Immigrants and Refugees in U.S.
News Media: Visual Framing and Its Effect on Emotions and Attitudes, 63 J. BROAD.
& ELEC. MEDIA 677, 680-81 (2019); Thomas Powell et al., Video Killed the News
Article? Comparing Multimodal Framing Effects in News Videos and Articles, 62 J.
BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 578, 579 (2018).
57
Bergan & Lee, supra note 55, at 197 (noting the base rates and proportions); Harmon et al., supra note 30, at 270-71.
58
Mastro & Figueroa-Caballero, supra note 53, at 320-23, 332-33; Riles et al., supra
note 26, at 302-05, 314; Stefanone et al., supra note 42, at 510, 512-13.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol37/iss4/18

10

Podlas: Reconsidering the Nomos

2022

RECONSIDERING THE NOMOS

2221

This also applies to the law.59 Much of what the public knows,
or thinks it knows, about law and the legal system comes from television.60 Police and forensic procedurals, judge/reality courtroom
shows, and the news tell stories about litigation, crime and criminals,
the integrity of the bench and bar, and how law works. Consistent with
scholarship on television in general, research shows that law as depicted on TV can nurture assumptions about the justice system,61 the
behavior of judges,62 and opinions about legal issues.63
The primary paradigms for understanding these impacts are
outlined below. This overview does not endeavor to be a research
methods primer, but seek to provide a foundation for understanding
how television may exert impacts,64 and thus, how it contributes to the
nomos.
A.

Heuristics

Television’s narratives provide countless examples of behavior
and causation. Research shows that people integrate them cognitively
as decision-making heuristics or schema.65 Heuristics are exemplars
59

Podlas, supra note 7, at 295-96; Podlas, supra note 5, at 497, 499.
Asimow, supra note 9, at xx-xxi; Podlas, supra note 7, at 295-96; Kimberlianne
Podlas, “The CSI Effect”: Exposing the Media Myth, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 430, 443–44 (2006); Podlas, supra note 5, at 493-96.
61
Asimow, supra note 9, at xxi-xiii; Podlas, supra note 7, at 290-292; Kimberlianne
Podlas, Broadcast Litigiousness: Syndi-Court's Construction of Legal Consciousness, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J 465 (2005); Sharp, supra note 17, at 113-120.
62
Asimow, supra note 9, at xxi-xxii; Syndicated Courtroom, supra note 10, at 558;
Podlas, supra note 61, at 483; Nancy S. Marder, Judging Reality Television Judges
in, LAW AND JUSTICE ON THE SMALL SCREEN, 229-49, 243-46 (Peter Robson & Jessica Silbey eds., 2012); Podlas, supra note 3, at 495.
63
Podlas, supra note 7, at 290, 299; Steven Keslowitz, The Simpsons, 24, and the
Law: How Homer Simpson and Jack Bauer Influence Congressional Lawmaking and
Judicial Reasoning, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2787, 2789 (2008); Kimberlianne Podlas,
As Seen on TV: The Normative Influence of Syndi-court on Contemporary Litigiousness, 11 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L. REV. 1, 10-11, 16-17 (2009).
64
Mike Schmierbach et al., Exploring Third-Person Differences Between Gamers
and Nongamers, 61 J. COMMC’N 307, 307-08 (2011) (Readers may think, “these effects apply to others, but they do not apply to me.” This exemplifies the well-documented “third person effect,” the tendency to believe that media affects others – third
parties – but not oneself.)
65
Klawitter & Hargittai, supra note 56, at 253; Riles, supra note 26, at 302-04;
Shrum, supra note 53, at 257; see also Podlas, supra note 7, at 297 (discussing television’s contribution to heuristics of law).
60
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or mental rules of thumb that help people process information quickly,
make sense of behavior, and draw inferences about events,66 such as
guilty people run or forensic evidence is absolute.67 The easier something is to recall – be it due to repeated exposure, personal impact, or
message attributes – the more powerful it is as a heuristic device.68
Hence, the more one watches television, the more one will be exposed
to television’s examples, making them easy-to-recall and apply heuristics.69
Furthermore, television’s depictions have been found to shape
judgements, and perceptions of how common or likely something is.70
When making judgements about a population or event, people draw on
these television exemplars and anecdotal “evidence;” furthermore,
viewers rely on these sources of information more heavily than statistics and numerical evidence.71
Television also supplies heuristics about the legal system,72
such as how innocent or trustworthy people (in contrast to guilty and
dishonest people) act and how judges behave.73 These televisionsourced heuristics are so meaningful that some research shows that
when trial evidence or testimony is ambiguous or conflicts with
66

Porismita Borah, Conceptual Issues in Framing Theory: A Systematic Examination
of a Decade’s Literature, 61 J. COMMC’N 246, 248 (2011); R. Kelly Garrett et al.,
Undermining the Corrective Effects of Media-Based Political Fact Checking? The
Role of Contextual Cues and Naïve Theory, 63 J. COMMC’N 1, 2 (2013); Richard K.
Sherwin, Symposium: Introduction: Picturing Justice: Images of Law & (and) Lawyers in the Visual Media 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 891, 892 (1995).
67
Podlas, supra note 47, at 90-91; see Asimow, supra note 9, at xxv n.5-8 (demonstrating that viewers who watch CSI overestimate the probative value of “scientific”
evidence presented by the prosecution, apparently applying a heuristic derived from
television).
68
Garrett et al., supra note 66, at 2. Additionally, the easier something is to recall,
the more common we think it is, which self-validates the heuristic.
69
Podlas, supra note 7, at 297; Kim & Kim, supra note 35, at 519-21, 531; Sarah
Sun Beale, The News Media's Influence on Criminal Justice Policy: How MarketDriven News Promotes Punitiveness, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 397 (2006).
70
Bergan & Lee, supra note 55, at 195, 197 (discussing base rates and proportions);
Harmon et al., supra note 30, at 270-71.
71
Bergan & Lee, supra note 55, at 195-97 (explaining exemplar theory); Mastro &
Figueroa-Caballero, supra note 53, at 320-21.
72
Podlas, supra note 47, at 88-90; Shrum, supra note 53, at 262–63.
73
Podlas, supra note 10, at 558; Nancy S. Marder, Judging Reality Television Judges
in, LAW AND JUSTICE ON THE SMALL SCREEN, 243-45 (Peter Robson & Jessica Silbey
eds., 2012); Richard K. Sherwin, Celebrity Lawyers and the Cult of Personality, 22
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 517, 519, 521 (2003).
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common narratives, jurors favor the account that most closely resembles a popular or commonly known story.74 Additionally, heuristics
can impact the public’s perception of litigants and litigation. For example, the frequency or number of media reports of civil litigation and
personal injury awards has been shown to contribute to juror and public perception that both are frequent.75 To illustrate, twenty-five years
ago, reports of an explosion of litigation began flooding media.76 Despite data to the contrary,77 the public came to believe there was a litigation crisis.78
B.

Framing

Another way television impacts viewers is through framing.79
Studies show that when television frames an issue or group of people80
in a particular way,81 the audience tends to adopt that framework in

74

NEAL FEIGENSON & CHRISTINA SPIESEL, LAW ON DISPLAY 148-50 (N.Y. Univ.
Press eds. 2009); Podlas, supra note 3, at 484-85.
75
Podlas, supra note 60, at 12-13; VALERIA P. HANS, BUSINESS ON TRIAL: THE CIVIL
JURY AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 70 (Yale Univ. Press / New Haven & London eds. 2000); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Determining Punitive Damages: Empirical
Insights and Implications for Reform, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 104, 118, 126 (2002).
76
Podlas, supra note 60, at 3-8 nn.7-15; Marc S. Galanter, Reading the Landscape
of Disputes: What We Know and Don’t Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 6-8 (1983); HANS,
supra note 75, at 70-71.
77
HANS, supra note 75, at 216-17; see also Podlas, supra note 60, at 8-10, 13-15
(citing studies disputing litigation crisis and showing correlation between heightened
publicity and public perceptions).
78
Podlas, supra note 63, at 3-8 and nn.7-15 (citations therein); Marc S. Galanter,
Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don’t Know (and Think We
Know) About our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4,
6-8 (1983); HANS, supra note 75, at 70-71.
79
Parrott et al., supra note 56, at 680.
80
For example, framing immigrants in pursuit of the American dream versus illegal
aliens stealing jobs from Americans, or Black Lives Matter protests against police
use-of-force as opposed to criminal riots and legitimate policing. Danielle K. Kilgo,
Police Violence and Protests: Digital Media Maintenance of Racism, Protest Repression, and the Status Quo, 65 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 157, 157-61 (2021).
81
Id. at 157-60 (analyzing the negative framing of Black people and framing protest
activity as criminal).
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thinking about the issue.82 Although the frame does not tell viewers
which opinion to hold (i.e., that immigration is bad or good), by
providing a lens through which to analyze the issue or event, it prompts
specific trains of thought that lead the viewer to form particular conclusions.83 In this way, the frame impacts perception.84 Once established, frames are unusually resilient to change.85 They are so resilient
that when people confront information contrary to the frame, they
maintain and even strengthen the frame.86 In fact, people tend to distrust sources that present information that conflicts with an established
frame.87
Inasmuch as a television frame becomes a template for assessing actions and understanding issues, it impacts the public’s acceptance of legal principles and support for legislation.88 For instance,
framing an incident as another police murder of a black man as opposed to an unfortunate death due to a suspect’s refusing to comply
with a lawful police order, influences whether the public thinks the

82

James Druckman & Toby Bolsen, Framing, Motivated Reasoning, and Opinions
About Emerging Technologies, 61 J. COMMC’N 659, 663 (2011); Parrott et al., supra
note 56, at 680-81; Powell et al., supra note 56, at 579.
83
Borah, supra note 66, at 247-28; Druckman & Bolsen, supra note 82, at 663; Erik
C. Nisbet et al., Attitude Change in Competitive Framing Environments? Open/Closed-Mindedness, Framing Effects, and Climate Change, 63 J. COMMC’N 766,
767 (2013); Young Mie Kim & John Vishak, Just Laugh! You Don’t Need to Remember: The Effects of Entertainment Media on Political Information Acquisition
and Information Processing in Political Judgment, 58 J. COMMC’N 338, 357 (2008);
Parrott et al., supra note 56, at 680-81; Powell et al., supra note 56, at 579.
84
Druckman & Bolsen, supra note 82, at 661-62; Nisbet et al., supra note 83, at 76667; Powell et al., supra note 56, at 579. In some instances, news frames can evoke
emotional responses. Theresa M. de los Santos & Robin Nabi, Emotionally Charged:
Exploring the Role of Emotion in Online News Information Seeking and Processing,
63 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 38, 39-42 (2019).
85
Additionally, exposure to television frames renders the concepts as framed more
accessible, thereby activating schema, and increasing its strength as a heuristic device Kyung Lee, When Big Brother Uses Twitter, Too: Productive Forms of Policing
and the Role of Media in the Seoul G20 Protests in South Korea, 8 COMMC’N
CULTURE & CRITIQUE 376, 378 (2015); Parrott et al., supra note 56, at 680; Powell
et al., supra note 56, at 579.
86
Druckman & Bolsen, supra note 82, at 663, 673; Garrett et al., supra note 66, at
617-19.
87
Garrett et al., supra note 66, at 617-18.
88
Margaret B. Kovera, The Effects of General Pretrial Publicity on Juror Decisions:
An Examination of Moderators and Mediating Mechanisms, 26 L. & HUM. BEHAV.
43, 62–65 (2002).
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action is legal or illegal, problematic,89 and whether the law needs to
be reformed and how.90 Similarly, the way television frames types of
evidence (e.g., anything labeled “forensic” is infallible), crime plots
(e.g., the jilted woman seeking revenge), and witnesses (e.g., scientific
experts as neutral scientists), guides jurors as they assess evidence and
construct a story of what occurred.91 In fact, information consistent
with an existing frame is deemed more believable, and “[i]f the facts
do not fit a frame, the frame stays and the facts bounce off.”92
The way television portrays members of the justice system can
also impact viewers’ opinion about them.93 One study showed that
habitual or heavy viewing94 of Law & Order (and its depiction of honorable prosecutors on the side of law and victims) was associated with
distinctly positive opinions of prosecutors and a belief that they were
“very moral.”95 Several studies have found that, consistent with CSI’s
portrayal of members of the forensics team as brilliant individuals
whose sole interest is using science to solve crime, viewers and jurors
think of witnesses testifying about forensic matters in a similar way.96
Indeed, to the extent that forensic drama viewing impacts jurors or the
public, it engenders positive opinions about forensics professionals97
and strengthens beliefs in the infallibility of their conclusions and forensic evidence.98

89

Kilgo, supra note 80, at 158-61, 170-72 (discussing the BLM protests); Brendan
R. Watson, Normalizing Community Structure’s Restraint on Critical Tweets About
a Polluting Industry, 58 J. BROAD. ELEC. MEDIA 581, 584-85 (analyzing media framing of the BP oil spill).
90
Podlas, supra note 3, at 479-82.
91
Id. at 481-82, 488-97.
92
Druckman & Bolsen, supra note 82, at 662.
93
Podlas, supra note 3, at 495-96; Podlas, supra note 27, at 11–14.
94
This was by viewers with no pre-existing bias for or against police and prosecutors.
95
Podlas, supra note 27, at 1; Podlas, supra note 3, at 497-500.
96
Simon A. Cole, A Surfeit of Science: The “CSI Effect” and the Media Appropriation of the Public Understanding of Science, 24 PUB. UNDERSTANDING SCI. 130, 131
(2015); Simon A. Cole, Forensic Science and Wrongful Convictions: From Exposer
to Contributor to Corrector, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 711, 718-19 (2012); Cole & Dioso-Villa, Investigating the ‘CSI Effect’ Effect: Media and Litigation Crisis in Criminal Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1335, 1348 (2009); Podlas, supra note 47, at 90-91.
97
Kar-Weng Chan, An Investigation Into the CSI Effect on the Malaysian Population, 45 AUST L.J. FORENSIC SCI. 417, 426 (2013).
98
Asimow, supra note 9, at xxiii, xxv.
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Agenda-Setting

Television also plays a role in agenda-setting.99 The core hypothesis of agenda-setting is that issue salience transfers from media
to audience; in other words, if media highlights an issue or frequently
show stories about it, the audience will perceive it important or deserving of attention.100 For example, research has found that the public
places the highest degree of importance on the issues most frequently
covered by television news programs.101
Once an issue has made it onto the public agenda, it may inspire
legislation, protest, or actions to address it.102 For example, once beliefs in the litigation crisis became part of the public agenda, people
proposed and supported legislation to limit damage awards and liability. Fifteen years ago, when media reports stated that a “CSI Effect”
was causing jurors to wrongly acquit, prosecutors began adjusting voir
dire and requesting special jury instructions,103 despite the fact that
scholars found no such anti-prosecution effect.104 Nonetheless, the
myth of the “CSI Effect” continued circulating in media and amongst
members of the bar. More recently, news media devoted significant
time and attention to teen sexting. Soon after, parents and politicians
advocated for legislation to combat the teen-sexting epidemic and,
within months, several states were debating sexting legislation.105 A
few months later, the issue garnered little to no news coverage, and
most of those proposed bills never matured into laws.106

99

Lee, supra note 45, at 22-24.
Bergan & Lee, supra note 55, at 198; Lee, supra note 45, at 22-24; Mastro &
Figueroa-Caballero, supra note 53, at 322.
101
Lee, supra note 45, at 22-24.
102
Podlas, supra note 47, at 91-92.
103
CHRISTINE A. CORCOS, PROSECUTORS AND PSYCHICS ON THE AIR: DOES A
‘PSYCHIC DETECTIVE EFFECT’ EXIST? 174 (Peter Robson & Jessica Silbey eds.,
2012); Podlas, supra note 60, at 463; Podlas, supra note 3, at 500-01.
104
Asimow, supra note 9, at xxiii, xxv.
105
Kimberlianne Podlas, The “Legal Epidemiology” of the Teen Sexting Epidemic:
How the Media Influenced a Legislative Outbreak, 12 PHG. TECH. L. POL’Y 1, 4-7,
10-12 (2011).
106
Id. at 34-35.
100
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Social Modeling

Television can impact social behaviors by showing people how
to behave.107 According to social cognitive theory (formerly known as
social learning theory), people learn how to behave by watching, and
then modeling, behaviors.108 In order to learn a behavior, people must
see it repeatedly, reference it, and then reproduce it.109 Television supplies a plethora of behavioral models displayed by countless people
and characters in various situations. Furthermore, because these are
concrete and often situated within scenarios tracking real-life, they are
easy to follow.110
These behavioral models also apply to the legal system and
how to act in a courtroom.111 As a testament to the impact of TV narratives on modeling behaviors within the legal system, after the influx
of American courtroom shows into France, litigants began calling
judges “Your Honor” and people started expecting Miranda warnings.112 The French system, however, is inquisitorial where the title
“Your Honor” is inappropriate, and Miranda warnings are specific to
the U.S. Constitution.113
E.

Cultivation

According to cultivation theory, the heavy, long-term exposure
to television’s depictions and themes cultivates in viewers perceptions
107

Wang, supra note 28, at 392; ALBERT BANDURA, SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY 6468 (1977) (model of social learning through television). The behavior socialized
depends on the narrative, to wit: the behaviors and interactions shown, which characters do or do not interact with which genders, races, and ethnicities, and the roles
and attributes of the characters/people. Riles et al., supra note 26, at 302-05, 314.
108
Stefanone et al., supra note 42, at 512-13; Mastro & Figueroa-Caballero, supra
note 53, at 323, 327.
109
Mastro & Figueroa-Caballero, supra note 53, at 323; Riles et al., supra note 26,
at 304.
110
Riles et al., supra note 26, at 302-05, 314, 320-21; Stefanone et al., supra note 42,
at 512-13; Wang, supra note 28, at 391; see also Harmon et al., supra note 30, at
270-71 (cognitive processing model); Mastro & Figueroa-Caballero, supra note 53,
at 322-23, 334 (social cognitive theory).
111
Podlas, supra note 5, at 500-03.
112
Barbara Villez, French Television Lawyers in “Avocats et Associes,” in MICHAEL
ASIMOW, LAWYERS IN YOUR LIVING ROOM! LAW ON TELEVISION 275, 275-77
(2009).
113
Id.; Asimow, supra note 9, at xxiii.
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of reality that are consistent with those shown on TV.114 This is not an
immediate, direct effect but a cumulative, subtle one observed in
“heavy” viewers, i.e., people who watch a significant amount of TV
(so are constantly inundated by television’s reality).115
Cultivation theory was developed in the 1970s, when there
were three commercial broadcast networks116 and a finite universe of
content.117 Therefore, it theorized that any “heavy” viewer who
watched a significant amount of television would be exposed to most
of the same depictions as any other “heavy” viewer.118 This reasoning
was sound, until cable and the proliferation of channels in the 1990s
gave viewers more content and more control over what they
watched.119 Because it can no longer be presumed that heavy viewers
of TV overall consume the same media diet,120 cultivation has been
refined to account for genre-viewing and “pockets of exposure.”121
114

Mastro & Figueroa-Caballero, supra note 53, at 322-23, 332; Podlas, supra note
47, at 89-90.
115
Asimow, supra note 9, at xxi-xxii; Podlas, supra note 47, at 89-90. Cultivation
does not hypothesize a 1:1 correlation between television viewing and a belief in
TV’s version of the world, or where moderate viewing leads to moderate impacts
and significant viewing leads to significant impacts.
116
Robert J. Thompson, Television in the United States, in ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA, (2019), https://www.britannica.com/art/television-in-the-UnitedStates/The-late-1960s-and-early-70s-the-relevance-movement (recounting the history of and changes in the ABC, CBS, and NBC in the 1970s).
117
Jonathan Cohen & Gabriel Weimann, Cultivation Revisited: Some Genres Have
Some Effects on Some Viewers, 13 COMMC’N REPS. 99, 101-02, 108 (2000); Morgan
and Shanahan, supra note 51, at 337–40.
118
Because cultivation is built on the idea that if viewers see something all the time,
they will come to think it is common, cultivation does not work the other way – the
absence or infrequency of depictions on television does not cultivate a perception
among frequent viewers that the unseen thing or unwitnessed behavior is uncommon.
The absence may impact the lack of role-modeling or explain why an issue failed to
reach the public agenda, but absence does not cultivate a perception of absence: In
mathematical terms, 0 depictions x 0 = 0.
119
See infra Section VII.
120
See Harmon et al., supra note 30, at 269-71; Riles et al., supra note 26, at 306,
316 (noting differences viewing among different groups of viewers); Rune Karlsen
et al., Do High-Choice Media Environments Facilitate News Avoidance?, 64 J.
BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 794, 794-96 (2020).
121
Chan, supra note 97, at 417-18 (genre-specific cultivation effect); David E.
Mancini, The “CSI Effect” in an Actual Juror Sample: Why Crime Show Genre May
Matter, 15 N. AM. J. PSYCHOL. 543, 545-48 (2013); David Tewksbury, The Seeds of
Audience Fragmentation: Specialization in the Use of Online News Sites, 49 J.
BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 332, 333 (2005).
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By disambiguating program types and using a direct (and more
precise) measure of content-type viewing researchers have found
genre-specific cultivation effects in heavy/frequent viewers of programs sharing narratives and depictions.122 In other words, heavy
viewers of a specific program genre have been found to hold beliefs
consistent with the repeated depictions endemic of that type of program.123
Cultivation is one of the primary theories used to explain lawrelated television’s impact on viewers.124 Research has shown that
when a heavy/frequent television viewer of a particular type of law
program repeatedly sees factual (i.e., news, documentaries) and fictional stories of crime and violence, over time, the viewer may come
to believe that crime and violence are common in the real world, typically perpetrated by certain races, or on certain genders.125 These stories can also cultivate viewer beliefs about judge behavior,126 and the
infallibility (and absolute objectivity) of forensic evidence presented
at trial.127
F.

Counterintuitive Impacts

It is important to recognize that effects can sometimes be counter-intuitive or factors such as message features,128 preceding

122
Tewksbury, supra note 120, at 343-44; Riles et al., supra note 26, at 306, 317;
Patrick Rossler & Hans-Bernd Brosius, Do Talk Shows Cultivate Adolescents’ Views
of the World? A Prolonged-Exposure Experiment, 51 J. COMMC’N 142, 160 (2001).
123
Chan, supra note 97, at 417-18; Mancini, supra note 120, at 545-48.
124
Asimow, supra note 9, at xxi-xxii; Podlas, supra note 10, at 89-90.
125
Jonathan Cohen & Gabriel Weimann, Cultivation Revisited: Some Genres Have
Some Effects on Some Viewers, 13 COMMC’N REPS. 99, 112 (2000); Robert Goidel,
et al., The Impact of Television Viewing on Perceptions of Juvenile Crime, 50 J.
BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 119, 121 (2006); Morgan & Shanahan, supra note 51, at
339; Scott Parrott & Caroline T. Parrott, U.S. Television’s “Mean World” for White
Women: The Portrayal of Gender and Race on Fictional Crime Dramas, 73 SEX
ROLES 70, 70 (2015).
126
Kimberlianne Podlas, Should We Blame Judge Judy?: The Messages TV Courtrooms Send Viewers, 86 JUDICATURE 38, 38 (2002); Kimberlianne Podlas, Please
Adjust Your Signal: How Television’s Syndicated Courtrooms Bias Our Juror Citizenry, 39 AM. BUS. L. J. 1, 2 (2001).
127
Cole & Dioso-Villa, supra note 96, at 137; Podlas, supra note 47, at 91-93; Podlas, supra note 60, at 432-36.
128
Fear appeals and disgust appeals can interfere with message processing and have
different impacts on different audiences. Glenn Leshner et al., When a Fear Appeal
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information,129 group identification,130 one’s ideological beliefs,131 and
whether people think the message is intended to persuade them.132 For
instance, the impact of persuasive messages, such as advertisements
and public service announcements, depends on the listener’s existing
attitudes.133 If the message is too far beyond the listener’s latitude of
acceptance, they will reject it.134 Additionally, some persuasive media
messages have the exact opposite impact the messenger intends: If the
listener perceives the message to threaten choice, reduce personal freedom, or take something away,135 it galvanizes the listener to react
against the message (i.e., defensive reactance or psychological reactance).136
Furthermore, depending on their existing attitudes or political
beliefs, people sometimes interpret television narratives or messages
differently.137 When a message is not overt, or is communicated
through humor, viewers tend to interpret its meaning to be consistent
with their existing political views.138 For example, satire is prone to
misinterpretation because it says one thing but means another.139 This
Isn’t Just a Fear Appeal: The Effects of Graphic Anti-tobacco Messages, 54 J.
BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 485, 486-487, 490-91 (2010).
129
For information on priming theory see Marc Ziegele et al., Socially Destructive?
Effects of Negative and Hateful User Comments on Readers’ Donation Behavior Toward Refugees and Homeless Persons, 62 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 636, 638-39,
648 (2018).
130
See infra Section XI(A).
131
See infra notes 206-07, 215-17, 245-47, 257-62.
132
Ziegele et al., supra note 129, at 640; see infra notes 232-234.
133
Ziegele et al., supra note 129, at 640-41.
134
Id.
135
Leshner et al., supra note 128, at 491, 501-03; Kira A. Varava & Brian L. Quick,
Adolescents and Movie Ratings: Is Psychological Reactance a Theoretical Explanation for the Forbidden Fruit Effect?, 59 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 149, 152-53
(2015); Wonsun Shin & Hye Kyung Kim, What Motivates Parents to Mediate Children’s Use of Smartphones? An Application of the Theory of Planned Behavior, 63
J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 144, 154-55 (2019).
136
Varava & Quick, supra note 135, at 152-53, 161; Ziegele, supra note 129, at 641.
Another iteration of defensive reactance is that when a person perceives a message
as intended to persuade them, they will reject it. Shin & Kim, supra note 134, at 15455.
137
Podlas, supra note 7, at 291-92; Ziegele et al., supra note 129, at 640.
138
Jody C. Baumgartner & Jonathan S. Morris, One “Nation,” Under Stephen? The
Effects of ‘The Colbert Report’ on American Youth, 52 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA
622, 624-25 (2008); Podlas, supra note 7, at 291-92.
139
Podlas, supra note 7, at 314.
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can confound the underlying message or cause audiences to interpret
the message differently than intended.140
Sometimes, scholars and researchers simply misread the narrative or hypothesize an effect based on a general narrative theme (e.g.,
forensics) rather than the actual narrative or lesson. Other times, they
interpret the underlying message differently than the average viewer.
These are not counter-effects or caused by mediating factors but reveal
mistakes or differences in interpretation. If a scholar misinterprets the
narrative or its lesson, they will end up analyzing the misinterpretation.
This underscores the value of empiricism and how it can help inform
more interpretive approaches to narrative.
VII.

CHANGES IN TV MEDIA ENVIRONMENT

In the last fifteen to twenty years, the media environment has
changed significantly.141 Digital, internet, and mobile technologies
have expanded the ways that people consume media and transformed
the notion of “watching TV.”142 A plethora of cable services, streaming platforms, and screens enable people to “watch TV” on devices
other than televisions, wherever, whenever, and however they wish.143

140

Id. at 291 (“[H]umor can increase audience attention, receptiveness, and positive
response to a message; on the other hand, satire’s style of saying one thing but meaning another can confound the underlying message . . . .”); Kimberlianne Podlas,
Homerus Lex: Investigating American Legal Culture through the Lens of the Simpsons, 17 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 93 (2007).
141
Lauren Feldman et al., Explaining Media Choice, 62 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA
109, 110 (2018); Homero Gil de Zúñiga & Hsuan-Ting Chen, Digital Media and
Politics: Effects of the Great Information and Communication Divides, 63 J. BROAD.
& ELEC. MEDIA 365, 368 (2019); Philipp Müller et al., Of Rules and Role Models:
How Perceptions of Parents’ Mediation and Modeling Contribute to Individuals’
Media Innovativeness, 62 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 692, 692 (2018).
142
Cédric Courtois & Sara Nelissen, Family Television Viewing and its Alternatives:
Associations with Closeness within and between Generations, 62 J. BROAD. & ELEC.
MEDIA 673, 675-77 (2018); Debra Muller Price & Kelly Kaufhold, Bordering on
Empathy: The Effect of Selective Exposure and Border Residency on Immigration
Attitudes, 63 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 494, 496 (2019); Alec Tefertiller & Kim
Sheehan, TV in the Streaming Age: Motivations, Behaviors, and Satisfaction of PostNetwork Television, 63 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 595, 595 (2019).
143
Jhih-Syuan Lin et al., Understanding the Nature, Uses, and Gratifications of Social Television: Implications for Developing Viewers Engagement and Network Loyalty, 62 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 1, 1 (2018); Lauren Reichart Smith et al., Tweet,
Retweet, Favorite: The Impact of Twitter Use on Enjoyment and Sports Viewing, 63
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Additionally, the explosion of content-providers and services144 has translated to a greater amount and variety of content.145
Whereas the traditional TV environment was low-choice – the audience chose from a pre-fix menu of relatively homogenous, “normcore” content146 – the present “post-network” era is defined by
choice.147 Today’s viewers have myriad options of what to watch and
how to watch it,148 and can craft a television diet tailored to their
unique tastes and interests.149
This combination of unprecedented choice and viewer control
manifests as viewer selectivity; not only can viewers choose which
content to watch, but they can choose which content to avoid.150 Counterintuitively, because highly selective viewers can reduce their exposure to non-preferred content, extensive choice in a sea of content can
result in viewers consuming a more limited array of television programming.151 In this way, audience selectivity leads to audience segmentation or fragmentation.152

J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 94, 95 (2019). Ten years ago, many in the television
industry considered streaming video a novelty that was ancillary to broadcast and
cable television. Today it is viable alternative to traditional television. Douglas A.
Ferguson, Book Review: The Audience and Business of YouTube and Online Videos,
62 J. BROAD.& ELEC. MEDIA 717, 717 (2018).
144
Harmon et al., supra note 30, at 270; Lin et al., supra note 143.
145
Feldman et al., supra note 140; Harmon et al., supra note 30, at 270; Smith et al.,
supra note 142; Nicholas W. Robinson et al., The Stubborn Pervasiveness of Television News in the Digital Age and the Field’s Attention to the Medium, 2010-2014,
62 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 287, 287-88 (2018).
146
A majority of content is intended for the largest proportion of the public possible.
Bernabo, supra note 26, at 79.
147
Stephanie Edgerly, Red Media, Blue Media, and Purple Media: News Repertoires
in the Colorful Media Landscape, 59 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 1, 1 (2015); Robinson et al., supra note 144, at 288.
148
Courtois & Nelissen, supra note 141, at 673, 675-76; Feldman et al., supra note
140; Carolyn A. Lin, The Challenge of Information and Communication Divides in
the Age of Disruptive Technology, 63 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 587, 589 (2019).
149
Bernabo, supra note 26, at 79, Edgerly, supra note 147; Feldman et al., supra note
140.
150
Bernabo, supra note 26, at 79; Feldman et al., supra note 140; Robinson et al.,
supra note 144, at 288.
151
Robinson et al., supra note 144, at 288.
152
Bernabo, supra note 26, at 79; Taberez Ahmed Neyazi et al., Channel Complementarity of Displacement? Theory and Evidence from a Non-Western Election Context, 63 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 656, 659-60 (2019); Price & Kaufhold, supra note
141.
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VIII. RECONSIDERING TELEVISION IMPACTS
Historically, television’s evolution as a medium and mechanism through which to consume content has increased both the use of
television media and television’s audience.153 Consequently, this expanded television’s cultural reach and potential impact. For example,
coaxial cables, satellite televisions, and digital streaming services provide television technology, and by extension content, to more people;
additionally, more networks and content creators led to more programming.154
The recent changes in television consumption and distribution,
particularly those resulting in audience selectivity and fragmentation,
require considering whether television’s status as a library of narratives or its impact has changed.155 This investigation presents two
main questions. First, and most fundamentally, has television been
displaced by new media; or, stated more simply, do people still watch
TV? Second, is there evidence that viewer selectivity, audience fragmentation, or mode of viewing either alters television’s impacts or undermines the premises upon which those impacts are based? Although
153

Harmon et al., supra note 30, at 280; Neyazi et al., supra note 151, at 657. Overall,
changes were additive and complementary rather than subtractive. Harmon et al.,
supra note 30, at 280. Cable, VCR/ DVD players, and DVRs gave viewers more
choice by enabling them to time-shift and select a greater range of content, Elia Powers, Building Buzz and Episodes With Bite-Sized Content: Portlandia’s Formula for
Turning a Video Project Into a Television Series, 58 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 342,
344-45 (2014); Tefertiller & Sheehan, supra note 141, at 597, but did not reduce the
overall audience for or access to TV content. See Neyazi et al., supra note 151, at
657-60.
154
Neyazi et al., supra note 151, at 657-60.
155
See Lindita Camaj & Temple Northrup, Dual-Screening the Candidate Image
during Presidential Debates: The Moderating Role of Twitter and Need to Evaluate
for the Effects on Candidate Perceptions, 63 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 20, 21, 24
(2019) (stating scholars are questioning how existing theories apply to the present
fragmented media environment); Lisa Glebatis Parks et al., Podcast Uses and Gratifications-Scale Development, 63 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 617, 619 (2019) (“Since
the 1970s, new communication media led to questions of how” existing theories of
TV use and consumption apply to new media.). A few academics have gone as far
as to suggest that the recent decline in the amount of television scholarship signifies
the declining relevance of the medium. Robinson et al., supra note 144, at 297-99.
Of course, less recent television-specific research does not mean that television’s impact has dissipated. Rather, new PhDs and junior researchers may be contemplating
the media forms and devices of their generation or extending television research to
these. In any event, most theories of media influence are not media-specific.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2022

23

Touro Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 4 [2022], Art. 18

2234

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 37

these questions are framed in terms of re-examining television effects
research, the answers speak to the impact of television narratives and,
in turn, to television’s contribution to the nomos.
IX.

IS TELEVISION RELEVANT: DO PEOPLE STILL “WATCH
TV”?

Many of the noted changes in the television environment translate to, and thus impact, television news programming differently than
entertainment and other programming. Accordingly, television news
is discussed separately.
Research shows that television remains a dominant cultural
medium.156 Although television viewing as traditionally understood –
meaning watching television programs on a television set via cable or
antenna – has declined,157 the consumption of television content across
modalities and screens has not.158 In fact, TV is thriving in the digital
age;159 furthermore, with the help of digital and streaming media, overall viewership of television content has risen.160
While broadcast and cable networks have lost viewers, streaming services have gained them.161 The “cord-cutters,” who networks
warned would destroy television,162 did not stop consuming television
content; they simply severed their abusive relationship with cable companies163 and took more control over what they watched and how.164
Some in the industry, citing time-displacement theory – which asserts
that use of a new media will reduce the use of old media – forecast that

156

Bernabo, supra note 26, at 85; Riles et al., supra note 26, at 304; Robinson et al.,
supra note 144, at 296.
157
Neyazi et al., supra note 151, at 657.
158
Lin et al., supra note 143, at 548-49.
159
Robinson et al., supra note 144, at 287-88.
160
Courtois & Nelissen, supra note 141, at 674-76 (increased TV consumption by
teens).
161
Lin et al., supra note 143, at 549 (millennials embrace new viewing styles); Neyazi et al., supra note 151, at 657 (especially younger viewers).
162
Brad Adgate, The Rise and Fall of Cable Television, FORBES (Nov. 2, 2020,
4:09PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bradadgate/2020/11/02/the-rise-and-fall-ofcable-television/?sh=3fab8c816b31.
163
This was after years of consumers complaining about bloated cable packages and
asking for ala carte service. Cable companies responding by raising prices; streaming services deployed technology to meet consumer need.
164
Neyazi et al., supra note 151, at 657.
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digital media would lead to the demise of television.165 This, however,
has little empirical support.166 In fact, it conflates the media mode (the
technology) with media content (television programs) and confuses
time-displacement with technology replacement. With TV, it is not
that people run out of time, but that the newer technology replaces the
older technology that delivered the media content.167 Nonetheless, despite the options offered by streaming services, broadcast (network)
television continues to draw millions of viewers daily and be the most
common way that people “watch” television programs.168 People
might watch TV differently than in the past, but they still consume a
lot of television content.169
X.

DO THEORIES OF TELEVISION IMPACTS REMAIN VIABLE?

Media research must keep pace with of cultural and technological shifts.170 Accordingly, when used in the context of research, the
terms “television” and “watching TV” need to reflect the contemporary medium, technology, and audience viewing behaviors. Provided
“watching TV” is understood as consuming television content independent of the screen and service used to watch that content, theories
of television effects remain relevant.
For many audiences, especially younger ones, “watching TV”
now means watching shows independent of the screen, provider, or
platform. Previously, because television content came to viewers almost exclusively through a TV set, “watching television” combined
consuming television content with doing so by looking directly at a
television. There was no need to disambiguate the concepts, as the
media viewed, and the mode of viewing were married. Today,
165
See Robinson et al., supra note 144, at 289 (noting common trope that new media
will replace old media).
166
Id. at 289 (displacement has been dispute by several media historians); see also
R. Stuart Geiger & Airi Lampinen, Old Against New, or a Coming of Age? Broadcasting in an Era of Electronic Media, 58 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 333, 335-36
(2014).
167
Technology replacement explains the relationship between the increase in streaming television use and decrease in cable subscriptions.
168
Mastro & Figueroa-Caballero, supra note 53, at 332; Riles et al., supra note 26,
at 303-04.
169
Camaj & Northrup, supra note 154, at 21; Robinson et al., supra note 144, at 28889.
170
Robinson et al., supra note 144, at 288.
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television content can be viewed on devices other than television sets
and delivered by entities other than networks. Therefore, logically, the
notion of “watching TV” should now be understood as consuming television content, regardless of device or screen.171 If it is meant to refer
only watching content broadcast by a television network on a television set, that can be specified by the researcher or survey, but it would
not alter the underlying theory of impact.172
Although audience selectivity and fragmentation undercut
“classic” cultivation’s theory of mainstreaming effects, contemporary
cultivation measures viewing of program type, rather than of television
hours overall.173 Consequently, viewer selectivity and programmatic
segmentation are already baked in. Accordingly, cultivation remains
a useful model for understanding the connection between frequent or
heavy viewing of program types and viewer beliefs consistent with the
repeated narratives of that programming type.174 One clarification is
that the hour threshold of frequent/ heavy viewing would apply regardless of screen or content provider, rather than only the time spent in
using a television set as the sole viewing mechanism.
In any event, most theories explaining television’s effects are
not TV-specific. Television just happens to be the source or delivery
mode of the content that constitutes the frame, schema, agenda item,
or behavioral model. Therefore, there is no reason that the difference

171

Similarly, instead of hours of viewing of content (overall) broadcast on a television set, researchers would frame the query and measurement in terms of television
programs or content – specific to category or type – on any platform.
172
If a viewer’s television consumption is restricted to streaming services, television
content options may be somewhat restricted. A Netflix-only or Disney+-only viewer
will receive no daily TV news content, late-night talk, or sports competition programs. By contrast, the programming on a Hulu-only diet more closely resembles
that of a broadcast or cable network. Nevertheless, the research detailed herein focuses on the type of content viewed (e.g., reality TV, police procedurals, news). Consequently, the limitations of certain platforms are irrelevant. It doesn’t matter why a
viewer does not watch certain content, it only matters whether they do watch it.
173
Chan, supra note 97, at 417-18; Mancini, supra note 120, at 545-48; Kimberlianne
Podlas, The “CSI Effect,” OXFORD RSCH. ENCYC. CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST.
(Aug.
22,
2017),
https://oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190264079.001.0001/acrefore-9780190264079-e-40; Podlas, supra note
47; Tewksbury, supra note 128, at 332.
174
Edgerly, supra note 147, at 4-5; Goidel et al., supra note 124, at 121; Mastro &
Figueroa-Caballero, supra note 53, at 321-23; Riles et al., supra note 26, at 306, 317.
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in screen or delivery mechanism would alter the impacts on audiences
or the theories explaining them.175
Finally, although some researchers have suggested that viewing on mobile devices causes greater or lesser effects, there is little
evidence that the modality one uses while watching content is a direct
factor.176 Rather, any measurable differences appear to be a function
of the characteristics of viewing, such the degree of attention paid to
content177 or message features and their impact on cognitive processing and memory.178
XI.

TELEVISION NEWS: A DIFFERENT STORY

While many of the changes presently impacting entertainment
television are either a direct or secondary result of technology, the TV
news eco-system evolved separately. Consequently, the drivers of
change, impacts on audience choice and selectivity, and the role of
digital and streaming media have been different in the news arena.
As with entertainment and non-news programming, today’s
news consumers enjoy unprecedented choice. There are more news

175

Additionally, recently published research on other mediums is likely transferrable
to television. Robinson et al., supra note 144, at 297-98.
176
See Thomas Powell et al., Video Killed the News Article? Comparing Multimodal
Framing Effects in News Videos and Articles, 62 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 578,
580-81 (2018).
177
Lin et al., supra note 143, at 590 (discussing impacts of skimming content on
phone in eye-byte culture).
178
For example, some have hypothesized that mobile devices improve learning, because people can refer to content easily and repeatedly, or because content tends to
be short and textual, so does not over-burden cognitive processing. Linda Dam et
al., Applying an Integrated Technology Adoption Paradigm to Health App Adoption
and Use, 62 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 654, 656-59, 668 (2018); see Powell et al.,
supra note 175, at 579-81. Others hypothesize that mobile devices reduce content
recognition and impair cognitive encoding, because checking the device involves
task-switching, reduces motivation to encode (because user learns there is no reason
to, but can recheck), and increases demands on information processing. Stephanie
Edgerly et al., Navigational Structures and Information Selection Goals: A Closer
Look at Online Selectivity, 58 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 542, 543-44 (2019); see
Powell et al., supra note 175, at 580-84, 591.
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outlets, content options,179 and ways to consume news than ever before.180
Network news viewership has declined,181 but cable news
viewership, along with consumption of news on digital platforms, such
as online social networking services (“SNS”) and Twitter, exploded.182
In fact, all platforms are combined, news consumption is higher than
ever.183 Digital and streaming news media, however, do not substitute
or replace television news consumption. Instead, these channels supplement it – at least for now.184 Hence, the portion of the public that
gets news from SNS and other digital sources has not yet abandoned
television (and traditional media). Television, specifically cable, remains the primary source for news.185 In fact, cable news is so popular
that Fox News Channel, MSNBC, and CNN, are ranked fifth, sixth,

179

Saifuddin Ahmed & Jaeho Cho, The Roles of Different News Media Use and Press
Freedom in Education Generated Participation Inequality, 63 J. BROAD. & ELEC.
MEDIA 566, 571 (2019); Price & Kaufhold, supra note 141, at 496.
180
Michael Barthel et. al, Measuring News Consumption in a Digital Era, PEW RSCH.
CTR. (Dec. 8, 2020), https://www.journalism.org/2020/12/08/measuring-news-consumption-in-a-digital-era; Ahmed & Cho, supra note 178, at 571; Di Zhu et al., Platform and Proximity: Audience Responses to Crime News on Desktop Computers and
Smartphones, 64 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 438, 438-39 (2020); Gil de Zúñiga &
Chen, supra note 140, at 365.
181
Leticia Bode et al., What Viewers Want: Assessing the Impact of Host Bias on
Viewer Engagement with Political Talk Shows, 62 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 597,
599 (2018); Kylah J. Hedding et al., The Sinclair Effect: Comparing Ownership Influences on Bias in Local TV News Content, 63 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 474, 475
(2019).
182
Bode et al., supra note 170; Gil de Zúñiga & Chen, supra note 140; Rick Porter,
Cable News Wave Crests in First Quarter as All 3 Networks Claim Victory,
HOLLYWOOD REP (Mar. 31, 2021, 7:10 PM), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/tv/tv-news/cable-news-ratings-first-quarter-2021-4158389.
183
Ahmed & Cho, supra note 178; Edgerly, supra note 147, at 13, 16-17. Surveys
show that people use a combination of platforms, enhancing television news with
online or SNS feeds, and traditional media. Edgerly, supra note 147, at 16-17; Price
& Kaufhold, supra note 141.
184
Robinson et al., supra note 144, at 288-89.
185
Geoffrey Baym, Book Review: This Program is Brought to You By: Distributing
Television News Online, 62 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 714, 714 (2018); Hedding et
al., supra note 180. This is especially true of older Americans. Hedding et al., supra
note 180. Half of the population ranks television as their primary source for news.
Baym, supra; Amy Mitchell et al, The Modern News Consumer, PEW RSCH. CTR.
(July 7, 2016), https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2016/07/07/the-modernnews-consumer.
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and seventh in terms of total viewers of all types of programming, just
behind CBS, NBC, ABC, and FOX.186
A.

News Differentiation and Audience Fragmentation

Most changes in television news can be traced to the emergence
of for-profit cable news.187 Cable news did not merely provide an alternative to the standard, fungible thirty-minute local and national television news; instead, for-profit cable news transformed the way viewers consumed news and, in doing so, the television news landscape
itself.188
The dawn of cable news expanded news programming exponentially.189 CNN, Fox News Channel, and MSNBC each provides
programming twenty-four hours a day and broadcasts approximately
as many hours of news programming per day as most traditional broadcast networks (e.g., ABC, CBS, FOX, NBC) and their local affiliates
do in a week. This boon for viewers, however, significantly increased
competition for them.190 As a result, cable networks and programs
sought to distinguish themselves and “brand” their news products.191

186

Michael Schneider, Year in Review: Most-Watched Television Networks — Ranking 2020’s Winners and Losers, VARIETY (Dec. 28, 2020, 10:08 AM), https://variety.com/2020/tv/news/network-ratings-2020-top-channels-fox-news-cnn-msnbccbs-1234866801.
187
Conway & Stryker, supra note 31, at 27-28; Edgerly, supra note 147, at 4-5.
188
Conway & Stryker, supra note 31, at 27-29.
189
Neyazi et al., supra note 151, at 657; Robinson et al., supra note 144, at 280-81
(noting the history and proliferation of cable networks). CNN, the first 24-hour cable
news network debuted in 1980, and was joined by MSNBC and Fox News Channel
(FNC) in 1996. CNN Launches, HISTORY (Nov. 24, 2009), https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/cnn-launches; Schneider, supra note 185.
190
See Conway & Striker, supra note 31, at 27-28; see Edgerly, supra note 147, at
2-3; see Eun Hwa Jung & Justin Walden, Extending the Television Brand: An Examination of Why Consumers Use Broadcast Network News Sites, 59 J. BROAD. & ELEC.
MEDIA 94, 94, 107 (2015); Kristen D. Landreville & Cassie Niles, “And That’s a
Fact!”: The Roles of Political Ideology, PSRs, and Perceived Source Credibility in
Examining Factual Content in Partisan News, 63 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 177,
179 (2019).
191
Jung & Walden, supra note 189, at 94; see also Barthel et al., supra note 179
(stating that 24-hour news channels forced news organizations to “drastically reevaluate their business models”).
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In the context of cable news, differentiation was stylistic and ideological.192
With regard to style, cable news is more opinion-oriented193
(evidenced by guests, discussions, and host commentaries) and entertainment-oriented than the facially-objective, balanced network
news.194 For instance, content analysis has found that cable news tends
to use conflict-oriented, sensationalistic, and “us versus them”
frames.195 With regard to ideology, cable news networks commonly
embrace a political slant or ideological bent.196 This is manifested both
by featuring ideologically-driven and politically-biased content while
presenting and analyzing information through a partisan lens.197 This
practice is exemplified by MSNBC and CNN (deemed left-leaning,

192

Bode et al., supra note 180, at 597; see Conway & Striker, supra note 31, at 2829; Edgerly, supra note 147, at 2-3; Landreville & Niles, supra note 189, at 179.
193
Edgerly, supra note 147 (noting the blurred line between news and commentary);
Conway & Stryker, supra note 31, at 24-25 (noting the transformation from news
into talk and opinion); Landreville & Niles, supra note 189, at 177 (showing the
opinion-oriented view).
194
Conway & Striker, supra note 31, at 27-28; Hedding et al., supra note 180, at
476-78. In traditional network news, media sources are more neutral and objective
in tone and approach to journalism. Cf. Edgerly, supra note 147.
195
Bode et al., supra note 180, at 599; Hyunseo Hwang et al., Seeing is Believing:
Effects of Uncivil Online Debate on Political Polarization and Expectations of Deliberation, 58 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 621, 623 (2014).
196
Feldman et al., supra note 140, at 125-26; Landreville & Niles, supra note 189,
at 179.
197
Bode et al., supra note 180, at 599; Hedding et al., supra note 180, at 476-78, 48889. One extensive study found that, regardless of media ownership, news stations
used Republican/Conservative sources more than Democrat/Liberal sources. Hedding et al., supra note 180, at 483. Nevertheless, Sinclair stations were far more
likely to use conservative sources. Id. at 483, 488-89.
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liberal, and Democrat)198 and Fox News Channel (deemed right-leaning, conservative, and Republican).199
Viewer selectivity in a world of ideologically-based cable news
enables selective exposure.200 Research shows that people prefer information that is congruent with their opinions and beliefs.201 Therefore, if given a choice, people opt for or seek media sources they expect
to agree with their existing beliefs and ideological dispositions.202
Hence, the selection process increases the likelihood of exposure to
pro-attitudinal content. In the context of news, viewers tend to select
content congenial or consistent with their viewpoints, rather than contrary or hostile to them.203 One study found that 54% of viewers studied preferred political news consistent with their existing attitudes and
were significantly more inclined toward partisan selectivity.204 Other

198

According to recent studies conducted by the Pew Research Center, Fox News
has right-leaning audiences, MSNBC and CNN have left-leaning audiences, and
ABC, CBS, and NBC national network TV have mixed audiences. Mark Jurkowitz
et al., Before Trump Tested Positive for Coronavirus, Republicans’ Attention to Pandemic Had Sharply Declined, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 7., 2020), https://www.journalism.org/2020/10/07/following-covid-19-news-appendix-grouping-respondents-bymajor-news-sources. The study defined an outlet to have a left-leaning audience if
the proportion of audience members identifying as liberal/Democrat was at least twothirds higher than the proportion identifying as conservative/Republican, and an outlet to have a right-leaning audience if the proportion of audience members identifying
as conservative/Republicans was at least two-thirds higher than the proportion identifying as liberal/Democrats. Id. By this metric, 55% and 66% of viewers of FNC
and Sean Hannity identified as conservative/Republican, 43% and 36% of viewers
of MSNBC and CNN identified liberal/Democrat (respectively). Id.
199
Id.; Feldman et al., supra note 140, at 125-26 (describing MSNBC and Fox News
as ideologically-based); Landreville & Niles, supra note 189, at 190.
200
Price & Kaufhold, supra note 141, at 496-97. This is rooted in psychology literature: people prefer information they expect to agree with. Id. at 496.
201
Bode et al., supra note 180, at 609; Edgerly et al., supra note 178, at 544; Price
& Kaufhold, supra note 141, at 496-97.
202
Edgerly, supra note 147, at 3-4; Price & Kaufhold, supra note 141, at 495-96
(stating that some research on Selective Exposure shows that people are exposed to
more ideological or partisan content while others show they are exposed to more
content).
203
Feldman et al., supra note 140, at 110-11; Neyazi et al., supra note 151, at 66061; Price & Kaufhold, supra note 141, at 506-07.
204
Feldman et al., supra note 140, at 122-23.
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studies have found that viewers of political talk shows selectively expose themselves to content or hosts that mirror their views.205
Selective exposure to news has implications beyond fragmenting audience shares.206 Choosing one news network over another often
distills to an ideological choice, whether the viewer realizes it or not.207
Consequently, selective exposure to news is associated with audience
polarization.208
When viewers of entertainment programming choose one program over another, their selection is “interest-based,” not ideological.209 Viewers from various political, religious, and cultural groups
watch one-hour dramas, sporting events, and syndicated sitcom repeats, might choose an NBC fire-rescue drama instead of an HGTV
home renovation show is not a politically partisan act.210 Therefore,
while expanded choice in entertainment programming produces some
audience fragmentation, it does not foster ideological segmentation.
The choice of TV news is different. News viewers exercise
interest-based selectivity by choosing news as the type of programming; they also can exercise partisan selectivity, to wit they can select
networks (and programming) consistent with their politics and points
of view.211 Therefore, viewers who choose Fox News instead of
MSNBC, or vice-versa, receive content and commentary that reinforces their existing beliefs.212 Consequently, the consequence of the
selection vis-à-vis content is ideological.

205

Bode et al., supra note 180, at 598; see also Conway & Striker, supra note 31, at
29 (demonstrating that evidence also shows that viewers tuning in to specific media
personalities find them highly credible).
206
Edgerly, supra note 147, at 1, 17 (explaining news media and news viewers have
become fragmented).
207
Neyazi et al., supra note 151, at 660-61.
208
Bode et al., supra note 180, at 598; Conway & Striker, supra note 31, at 24-25;
Neyazi et al., supra note 151, at 660-61; Price & Kaufhold, supra note 141, at 497.
209
Neyazi et al., supra note 151, at 660-61.
210
Admittedly, some genre or programs have ideological undertones (such as “firefighters are heroes” or “detectives and police arrest the right person and catch the
bad guy”) that contribute to heuristics, base-rate judgements, and the cultivation of
values consistent with the portrayals.
211
Feldman et al., supra note 140, at 110; see, e.g., Neyazi et al., supra note 151, at
660-61.
212
Feldman et al., supra note 140, at 122-23; Hedding et al., supra note 180, at 478;
Price & Kaufhold, supra note 141, at 507.
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As networks stay “on brand,” they utilize biased or partisan
sources and shield viewers from competing information and
sources.213 Furthermore, by watching an ideologically-congruent network, viewers are less likely to be exposed to contrary ideologies and
information.214 The news ecosystem becomes transmogrified into an
“echo system” where disparate audiences exist in disparate self-reinforcing bubbles215 and ideological content domains.216 Notably, viewers do not need to purposely avoid non-congruent opinions; simply by
actively focusing on consistent content, viewers do not incidentally encounter it.217 Yet, because the viewer did not actively avoid content,
they may not realize their news diet is limited.218
Additionally, these audiences receive varied and uniquely
framed content, their information bases diverge, which causes an information divide. This contributes to polarization.219 Once formed,
these bubbles are unusually resilient. Segmented audiences can perceive counter-information as inaccurate and untrustworthy, or interpret
it to reinforce existing their beliefs.220 At its most extreme, this is exemplified by the “hostile news bias” (or “hostile media phenomenon”).221 Some audiences who believe mainstream media is biased
against their point of view, essentially over-correct for that perceived

213

Hedding et al., supra note 180, at 478.
Edgerly, supra note 147, at 1, 3-4; Lin et al., supra note 143, at 590, 592; Neyazi
et al., supra note 151, at 660-61.
215
Edgerly, supra note 147, at 543; Hedding et al., supra note 180, at 478.
216
Neyazi et al., supra note 151, at 661-62.
217
Price & Kaufhold et al., supra note 141, at 496-97; see generally Lin et al., supra
note 143, at 590, 592 (explaining segmentation and deepening information divides
occur both because viewers choose what to see and then are less likely to “accidentally” see alternative news).
218
Price & Kaufhold et al., supra note 141, at 496-97; see generally Neyazi et al.,
supra note 151, at 661-62 (explaining that viewers do not realize news received is
limited).
219
Bode et al., supra note 180, at 598; Edgerly, supra note 147, at 2-3, 16-17; Price
& Kaufhold, supra note 141, at 497; see also Conway & Striker, supra note 31, at
24-25 (contribution of partisan television news and talk shows).
220
Feldman et al., supra note 140, at 115; see also Landreville & Niles, supra note
189, at 179; Marlene Kunst et al., Spirals of Speaking Out? Effects of the ‘Suppressed
Voice Rhetoric’ on Audiences Willingness to Express Their Opinion, 64 J. BROAD.
& ELEC. MEDIA 396, 400 (2020).
221
Kunst et al., supra note 218, at 399-401.
214
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bias,222 and interpret neutral news coverage as negatively-biased.223
Therefore, despite the “common sense” inclination to “pop” informational bubbles by presenting contrary or corrective information, studies
show this is ineffective and frequently counterproductive. Rather than
changing a person’s opinion, opposing information can either cause
people to actively reject the counter-information or trigger the existing
partisan opinion, reinforcing it.224
In these ways, abundant audience choice in news enables selective exposure to news which, in turn, leads to audience segmentation and polarization.225 Therefore, ironically, some people consume
more hours of news than in the past, but they see a smaller range of
news content. Furthermore, this is becoming more pronounced and
divisive. To illustrate, in 2020, the three main cable news networks
(Fox News Channel, MSNBC, and CNN) gained significant numbers
of viewers, as broadcast networks lost them.226 This means that viewers are replacing relatively neutral, objective network news with more
ideologically-driven coverage.
B.

Digital Media and News

When news is supplemented with digital or SNS news, these
impacts are exacerbated; thus, already segmented audiences are driven
farther apart to thrive in distinct multi-verses with their own beliefs,
facts, and stories. Although digital media does not appear to have cannibalized television news viewership, it plays a key role in making audience polarization and informational divides more extreme. Therefore, as we consider narratives, we must begin to contemplate the role
of Twitter in producing, distributing, and transforming narratives, and,
in turn, the notion of a singular nomos. What follows is not intended
as a complete analysis of Twitter and its effects, but rather, an
222

Id. at 401, 411-12.
Feldman et al., supra note 140, at 11; Kunst et al., supra note 218, at 399-401
(explaining how cable viewers who self-identify as ideologically right or members
of an “outgroup” skew this way).
224
Landreville & Niles, supra note 189, at 177-79; see Price & Kaufhold, supra note
141, at 497-98, 506-07 (explaining that this causes a “reinforcing spiral” or confirmatory spiral).
225
Lin et al., supra note 143, at 590, 592; Conway & Striker, supra note 31, at 2425; Edgerly, supra note 147, at 1, 17; Hedding et al., supra note 180, at 478; Neyazi
et al., supra note 151, at 660-61.
226
See Schneider, supra note 185.
223
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overview of how Twitter acts synergistically with and enhances cable
news impacts.
C.

Twitter

According to the Pew Research Center, almost two-thirds of
Americans obtain news from social media, and for many people, Twitter is a key source for that news.227 As of 2019, Twitter had 330 million
monthly active users and 139 million daily active users.228
It may seem odd to jump from cable news to Twitter, especially
when skipping over legacy SNS (like Facebook and LinkedIn); but,
while social media tends to get lumped together, it is not interchangeable.229 Research increasingly shows that Twitter possesses characteristics that not only distinguish it from other social media but also operate synergistically to aggravate and exacerbate the negative
ramifications associated with cable news selectivity and consumption.230
Whereas Facebook communication focuses on people who the
user already knows or has existing ties (e.g., family, work, fandom),
Twitter communication tends to be with people not personally known
to the user.231 Twitter is used differently; its content goes directly and
immediately to user groups232 and contains a higher proportion of

227

Aaron Smith & Monica Anderson, Social Media Use in 2018, PEW RSCH. CTR.
(Mar. 1, 2018), https://pewrsr.ch/2FDfiFd.
228
Amanda D. Damiano & Jennifer R. Allen Catellier, Up in Smoke: A Content Analysis of Tweets During the Vaping-Related Illness Epidemic, 14 J. COMMC’N
HEALTHCARE 41, 46 (2021); Smith & Anderson, supra note 226 (citing that 24% of
adults use Twitter, there are 68 million monthly active users, and 38% of users are
between the ages of 18 and 29 in the United States.).
229
Chang Wan Woo et al., Twitter Talk and Twitter Sharing in Times of Crisis: Exploring Rhetorical Motive and Agenda-Setting in the Ray Rice Scandal, 71 COMMC’N
STUD. 40, 50 (2019).
230
See Moran Yarchi et al., Political Polarization on the Digital Sphere: A CrossPlatform, Over-Time Analysis of Interactional, Positional, and Affective Polarization on Social Media, 38 POL. COMMC’N. 98, 98-99 (2020) (measuring and detailing
differences in political polarization and homophily on Twitter compared with other
sites).
231
Sebastian Valenzuela et al., Ties, Likes, and Tweets: Using Strong and Weak Ties
to Explain Differences in Protest Participation Across Facebook and Twitter Use,
35 POL. COMMC’N 117, 122 (2018); Woo et al., supra note 228, at 52-53.
232
Reichart Smith et al., supra note 142, at 96.
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political and public affairs information.233 Twitter has emerged as a
cultural forum, in the model of TV,234 and as a “public sphere in which
to discuss public affairs.”235
Because groups are chosen by the user, selective exposure to
information and ideologies is inherent.236 Therefore, like cable news,
Twitter users receive a narrower range of information,237 which contributes to the information divide,238 and cultivates homophily.239 The
extreme “personalization” features of Twitter, however, makes the operation and impacts of these more extreme.240 Furthermore, inasmuch
as Twitter facilitates networks among people holding similar beliefs
and socio-political views, it is an “echo chamber”241 tailor-made for
cultivating ideologically “fragmented and hyperpolarized communities.”242 This can exacerbate political and ideological polarization, especially when communication is structured along political lines and
users interact within politically homogeneous or like-minded clusters.243

233

Dorothee Arlt et al., Between Fragmentation and Dialogue. Twitter Communities
and Political Debate About the Swiss “Nuclear Withdrawal Initiative,” 13 ENV’T
COMMC’N 440, 441-42 (2018); see Weiai Wayne Xu & Miao Feng, Talking to the
Broadcasters on Twitter: Networked Gatekeeping in Twitter Conversations with
Journalists, 58 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 420, 421-23 (2014).
234
Bernabo, supra note 26, at 77-85; see Arlt et al., supra note 233, at 373-77.
235
Xu & Feng, supra note 232, at 422.
236
Camaj & Northup, supra note 154, at 23; De los Santos & Nabi, supra note 84, at
40, 43-44; Edgerly et al., supra note 178, at 544-46, 556; Chang Sup Park & Barbara
K. Kaye, Mediating Roles of News Curation and News Elaboration in the Relationship between Social Media Use for News and Political Knowledge, 63 J. BROAD. &
ELEC. MEDIA 455, 456-57 (2019) (explaining how social media leads to selective
exposure and encourages exposure to like-minded information).
237
Tanya Kant, Giving the ‘Viewser’ a Voice? Situating the Individual in Relation to
Personalization, Narrowcasting, and Public Service Broadcasting, 58 J. BROAD. &
ELEC. MEDIA 381, 390-91, 394-95 (2014).
238
Gil de Zúñiga & Chen, supra note 140, at 367-68.
239
Camaj & Northrup, supra note 154, at 23; Edgerly et al., supra note 178, at 556.
240
Kant, supra note 237, at 384, 389-91.
241
Arlt et al., supra note 233, at 442-44; Edgerly et al., supra note 178, at 543.
242
Arlt et al., supra note 233, at 444; Adam Klein, From Twitter to Charlottesville:
Analyzing the Fighting Words Between the Alt-Right and Antifa, 13 INT'L J.
COMMC’N 297, 301 (2019).
243
Arlt et al., supra note 233, at 443; Hsuan-Ting Chen & Jhih-Syuan Lin, Crosscutting and Like-minded Discussion on Social Media, 65 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA
135, 135-16 (2021); Kant, supra note 237, at 395.
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In fact, although some heralded Twitter for bypassing traditional gatekeepers and leveling the playing field of information-distribution,244 it does not appear to increase the quality of dialog among
varied groups.245 Rather than expanding the topics of conversation or
probing different viewpoints, Twitter users with different perspectives
tend to ignore each another.246 Instead, users tend to interact with likeminded people, making them more entrenched in their views.247 Alternatively, research has found that when such groups do “interact,”
they do not engage in constructive intellectual debate; rather, they criticize the other side and heighten the rhetoric.248 This does not improve
political discussion, but worsens polarization.249 Additionally, exposure to this type of uncivil political discourse can produce negative
emotions and attitudes toward the opposing side and erode individuals’
expectations about reaching consensus through deliberation.250
Moreover, unlike passive news viewers, Twitter users can both
circulate and edit information.251 By commenting on Tweets and editing news threads, users can reshape media narratives and construct
alternative realities.252 This, along with content tweeted and retweeted,

244

Xu & Feng, supra note 232, at 421-24.
Klein, supra note 241, at 299, 314; Benjamin R. Warner, Segmenting the Electorate: The Effects Of Exposure To Political Extremism Online, 61 COMMC’N STUD.
430, 431 (2010).
246
Marc A. Smith & Lee Rainie, Mapping Twitter Topic Networks: From Polarized
Crowds to Community Clusters, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Feb. 20, 2014),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/02/20/mapping-twitter-topicnetworks-from-polarized-crowds-to-community-clusters.
247
Arlt et al., supra note 233, at 443; Warner, supra note 244 (“If individuals are
only in contact with people they already agree with, there is a danger that their opinions will polarize and become increasingly radical.”).
248
Hwang et al., supra note 194, at 624; Woo et al., supra note 228, at 52-53.
One study of Twitter messages (preceding Charlottesville) found that a majority of
messages emanating from either side were fixated on the opposition. Klein, supra
note 241, at 299 (“Twitter is host to some of the most contentious factions of the
current hyperpartisan climate.”); Klein, supra note 241, at 314 (“purist discourse,
which attacks a political mind-set as the underlying issue, is indicative of a pattern
of thriving debate on Twitter”).
249
Woo et al., supra note 228, at 52-53; Klein, supra note 241, at 299.
250
Hwang et al., supra note 194, at 624-25.
251
Xu & Feng, supra note 232, at 420.
252
Arlt et al., supra note 233, at 441; Park & Kaye, supra note 236, at 456-58, 460,
468-69; Xu & Feng, supra note 232, at 420-22.
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influences how others perceive or frame issues253 and shapes the public
agenda.254
Aside from the content itself, users can instantaneously comment and see others’ responses.255 By encouraging user-readers to participate as creator-curators through sharing and commenting, Twitter
adds a level of active engagement that generates a greater sense of involvement.256 Indeed, people who post their own thoughts or reply to
tweets (as opposed to retweeting or not posting) report higher levels of
enjoyment.257
Additionally, studies have shown that user-generated content
can empower others to express opinions and trigger a “spiral of empowerment.”258 On Twitter, once users see that other people agree
with them, they are more likely to speak.259 This can cultivate a sense
of belonging to a group260 and enhance self-esteem.261 Furthermore,
some people increase their sense of belonging by engaging in expressive participation in service of the group.262 When they see that people

253

Woo et al., supra note 228, at 41-42; Xu & Feng, supra note 232, at 420-22.
Woo et al., supra note 228, at 42-43. Twitter’s “agenda-setting flow [is] dynamic
and two-way.” Id. at 53.
255
Twitter users tend to follow, mention, post, reply to Twitter users with similar
political views. Camaj & Northrup, supra note 154, at 23.
256
Some researchers hypothesize that news curation leads to greater informationengagement and requires curators to think about and analyze the information they
curate and comment on, and, therefore, increases political knowledge for the curators. Park & Kaye, supra note 236, at 455, 468-69.
257
Smith et al., supra note 142, at 105.
258
Kunst et al., supra note 218, at 400-01. This is the inverse of the “Spiral of Silence”: People who believe their views are out of the norm or in the minority tend to
remain silent. This silence prompts others to remain silent and reinforces not speaking, thereby creating a spiral of silence. Kunst et al., supra note 218, at 400-01;
Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, The Spiral of Silence: A Theory of Public Opinion, 24 J.
COMMC’N 43 (1974); Jung Won Chun & Moon J. Lee, When Does Individuals’ Willingness to Speak Out Increase on Social Media?, 74 COMPUT. HUM. BEHAV. 120
(2017); Moon J. Lee & Jung Won Chun, Reading Others’ Comments and Public
Opinion Poll Results, 65 COMPUT. HUM. BEHAV. 479, 479-80 (2016).
259
Kunst et al., supra note 218, at 400-01.
260
Smith et al., supra note 142, at 97.
261
Kenon A. Brown et al., Rings of Fandom: Overlapping Motivations of Sport,
Olympic, Team and Home Nation Fans in the 2018 Winter Olympic Games, 64 J.
BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 20, 22 (2020). This has long been explored by social identity theory and is one way to understand fandom. Id. at 22-23.
262
Lee & Chun, supra note 257; Kunst et al., supra note 218, at 401, 411-12; Arlt
et al., supra note 233, at 443, 446. As the process of self-categorization of a group/
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in their reference group share their views, they feel socially supported
and continue speaking.263
Nevertheless, users embracing such an “echosystem” of their
chosen viewpoints, and devoid or hostile or to contrary information,264
become isolated and homogenized.265 This is especially troubling
since misinformation is pervasive in the digital world,266 and social
media allows individuals to spread and share it quickly.267 This not
only deepens the information divide,268 but each time a story is retweeted or shared with comments, it adds a patina of consensus, “selfvalidating” the underlying content. Additionally, the restriction on
message length (formerly 140 characters and now 280 characters) often causes people to “oversimplif[y] complex issues” contributing to
further misunderstandings.269
D.

Algorithms

Not only can users curate the information they receive and alter
how Twitter displays content to others,270 but also Twitter
in-group member progresses from attraction and attachment to group allegiance, ingroup members alter mechanisms for storytelling. Brown et al., supra note 260, at
21.
263
Lee & Chun, supra note 257, at 125-26, 143; Kunst et al., supra note 218, at
401, 411-12.
264
Arlt et al., supra note 233, at 402-03, 412-13.
265
Camaj & Northrup, supra note 154, at 23.
266
Michelle A. Amazeen & Erik P. Bucy, Conferring Resistance to Digital Disinformation: The Inoculating Influence of Procedural News Knowledge, 63 J. BROAD. &
ELEC. MEDIA 415, 415-16 (2019); Emily K. Vraga et al., Testing Logic-based and
Humor-based Correction for Science, Health, and Political Misinformation on Social Media, 63 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 383, 394 (2019). Although much news on
social media originates from professional journalists and news organizations, some
is written by self-styled citizen journalists, alternative providers, nonprofit organizations, and PR firms. Park & Kaye, supra note 236, at 456-57, 468-69.
267
Park & Kaye, supra note 236, at 456; Vraga et al. supra note 265, at 394; Woo et
al., supra note 228. Others believe that the digital world can effectively reduce misinformation, because people can identify mistakes, immediately correct them, and
distribute those corrections, or because they are already online, so can easily check
and correct information. Vraga et al., supra note 265, at 394.
268
Amazeen & Bucy, supra note 265, at 415.
269
Woo et al., supra note 228, at 44.
270
Paul Hitlin & Lee Rainie, Facebook Algorithms and Personal Data, PEW RSCH.
CTR. (Jan. 16, 2019), https://pewrsr.ch/2Hnqr1o; Park & Kaye, supra note 236, at
456; Jieun Shin & Kjerstin Thorson, Partisan Selective Sharing: The Biased
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automatically and obliquely chooses the news and information users
receive.271 This “personalization” is done by an algorithm, often without the user realizing it.272
Twitter, like much digital media,273 uses algorithms to refine
and filter information delivered to users, based on past choices and interests.274 These smart algorithms, embedded in the digital media delivery systems, “remember” what the viewer has previously viewed,
clicked, shared, or sought,275 and then displays and suggests content
based on this history.276 Therefore, once a person has entered a Twitter
community, following or sharing news or informational content, the
future information he or she receives is filtered according to their past
choices and what the algorithm thinks is of most interest to that user.
277

As the algorithm continues to refine the relevance of content
shown to the user, the content delivered becomes increasingly narrow.278 Hence, the user may be exposed to more sources or individual
voices, but they share the same hymnal or sing in the same key. Consequently, in a digital world with infinite information and choice, the
user receives a more restricted diet of information.279 Similarly, when
the topic choice is political or ideological, the algorithm provides ideologically-or politically-congenial information, thus giving different
segments of the population completely different information about the
world.280 Therefore, a person who obtains most of their news from
social media sites sees information consistent with their beliefs, but is
Diffusion of Fact-Checking Messages on Social Media, 67 J. COMMC’N 232, 234
(2017) (users tend to share attitude-consistent messages).
271
Kant, supra note 237, at 354; Park & Kaye, supra note 236, at 458; Edgerly et al.,
supra note 178, at 541-43; Will Oremus, Twitter’s New Order, SLATE (Mar. 5, 2017,
8:00 PM), https://bit.ly/2lMs0pU;.
272
Park & Kaye, supra note 236, at 458; ELI PARISER, THE FILTER BUBBLE: WHAT
THE INTERNET IS HIDING FROM YOU (2011).
273
Lin et al., supra note 143, at 590, 592.
274
Park & Kaye, supra note 236, at 458,
275
Lin et al., supra note 143, at 589-92.
276
Gil de Zúñiga & Chen, supra note 140, at 367, 369; Lin et al., supra note 143, at
588-89; Park & Kaye, supra note 236, at 456-58.
277
Carolyn Lin, A Year Like No Other: A Call to Curb the Infodemic and Depoliticize
a Pandemic Crisis, 64 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 661, 664 (2020); Park & Kaye,
supra note 236, at 458.
278
Edgerly et al., supra note 178, at 547.
279
Kant, supra note 237, at 389-91; Park & Kaye, supra note 236, at 458.
280
Lin et al., supra note 143, at 590.
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unlikely to come across contrary information.281 This contributes to
deepening information divides, but to a far more pronounced degree.282
Furthermore, because users in these biased universes283 may
not realize that the news delivered to them is restricted, they may think
they are exposed to a broader – or at least representative – base of information and that they are part of a larger consensus group than they
truly are.284 Contributing to this, 5% to 16% of Twitter users are bots
and another 36% are bot-assisted.285 Even a small proportion of bots
can have a big impact on shaping news discourse.286 Bots can spread
misinformation, promote particular viewpoints and issues, and generate trends that elevate some topics and bury others.287
Accordingly, although Twitter has the potential to be a forum
for alternative viewpoints, and a means to bypass traditional media
gatekeepers,288 it can also spread misinformation and cultivate evermore extreme views and segments of the population. Even at its most
beneficial, Twitter tends to silo people into disparate groups, and deliver each group information consistent with their existing beliefs and
in furtherance of their cultural narratives. Unlike a 500-channel or
streaming television buffet where viewers can fine-tune their diet of
television content, Twitter is not so much a world of many, albeit differing, contrary, or debated narratives; instead, it is an array of several
separate, disparate worlds.
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(2020).
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XII.

THE INFLUENCE OF COVER ON TELEVISION & LAW

Vol. 37

Cover’s theory of the nomos and recognition of the critical role
of narratives, wherever they exist and in whatever language they are
expressed, not only expanded conceptions of legal culture, but also advanced the scholarship of “popular legal culture.” Moreover, it provided the scaffold that helped elevate television (as both cultural messenger and media product) to a legitimate object of scholarly study. 289
When Cover published Nomos and Narrative, the Law & Pop Culture
movement, vis-à-vis the study of film and literature, was gaining intellectual traction, but television was largely ignored or treated like an
unsophisticated, intellectually-challenged cousin.290 Indeed, in the
U.S., the study of television as Pop Legal Culture, with its own theories, foci, and methods, did not coalesce until approximately ten to fifteen years ago.291
Ultimately, Cover’s insights and insistence that “[n]o set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that locate it and give it meaning”292 helped provide a foundation for scholars
of law and related disciplines to advocate for the importance of paying
attention to the cultural media products that a majority of people actually consume, to wit: television, and contemplate what its narratives
say about law and the public’s perceptions of the law. Particularly in
our increasingly polarized(ing) media and cultural environment, where
it often seems like people exist in separate worlds, a better understanding of how television’s representations of law are interpreted by and
affect the public is a valuable tool.
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In fact, that is how I came to know of Robert Cover. He was the respected legal
scholar who provided a theoretical foundation from which I (a “law orphan” teaching
in an undergraduate Media Studies/Film program) could argue that television’s depictions of law mattered to legal culture and warranted investigation.
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292
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